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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(a) (2007).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's imposition of an
injunction against Appellants' interference with the maintenance of Wendy V drive-through
facilities.
The Court of Appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness, focusing on whether that
court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review.
In the context of a summary judgment motion, which presents a question of law, the Court
employs a correctness standard and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT
414 12, 164 P-3d 366 (citing Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50,1 7, 94 P.3d 915).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs/Appellants Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises, LC and White Investment Co.,
Inc. (collectively, "Appellants") own the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the "Shopping
Center") located at approximately 3300 East 3300 South in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Defendant/Appellant Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc. ("Wendy's")
owns and operates a restaurant on a parcel within the Shopping Center (the "Wendy's
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Property"). This case concerns the location of a drive-through lane and related facilities (the
"Drive-Through Facilities") constructed in 1982 and associated with the Wendy's Property.
Course of Proceedings
This action was originally filed by Metropolitan Square Associates ("Metropolitan
Square") on July 30, 2004. [R. at 1.] Metropolitan Square's Complaint alleged that the
Drive-Through Facilities constituted a trespass with respect to the Shopping Center and a
breach of contract with respect to the Declaration of Restrictions and Grant of Easements (the
"Declaration") governing the Shopping Center. [R. at 2-4.] Metropolitan Square sought an
injunction requiring Wendy's to remove the Drive-Through Facilities and unspecified
monetary damages. [R. at 4.] In its Answer, Wendy's denied Metropolitan Square's
allegations. Wendy's also and asserted counterclaims for: (1) a declaratory judgment to the
effect that Wendy's is entitled to maintain the Drive-Through Facilities in their present
location; (2) recognition of a prescriptive easement in Wendy's favor pursuant to which
Wendy's is entitled to maintain and use the Drive-Through Facilities in theirpresent location;
and (3) an injunction barring Metropolitan Square from interfering with Wendy's' right to
use and maintain the Drive-Through Facilities. [R. at 15-60.]
Following some discovery, Metropolitan Square filed an Amended Complaint, which
substituted Appellants as plaintiffs and added allegations to the effect that Wendy's' menuboard signs (the "Menu-Board Signs") also constitute a breach of the Declaration. [R. at 7887, 102-03.]
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Wendy's filed a motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2005. [R. at 11416.] After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court entered a Minute Entry on
December 12,2005 granting Wendy's' motion. [R. at 307-10.] The trial court subsequently
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Final Judgment dismissing all claims
asserted in Appellant's Amended Complaint. [R. at 375-83; 384-87.] The trial court's Final
Judgment stated that the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs are permitted by
the Declaration and may remain in place, enjoined Appellants from interfering with Wendy's
use and maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs, and awarded
Wendy's its costs and attorneys' fees in the amount of $19,516.50. [R. at 384-87.]
Appellants appealed the trial court's Final Judgment. [R. at 397-99.] The Utah Court
of Appeals issued an opinion following full briefing and oral argument. [2007 UT App 211.]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Final Judgment in part and reversed and
remanded in part. Specifically, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination
that Appellants' trespass claim was time barred, and affirmed the trial court's decision to
enjoin Appellants from interfering with the Drive-Through Facilities. [Id., at ]flf 27-30.] In
addition, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
Wendy's' favor on Appellants' breach of contract claim with respect to the Menu-Board
Signs. [Id., at 118.] The Court of Appeals also vacated the trial court's award of attorneys
fees and costs and remanded the issue to the trial court. [Id., at | 33.]
Appellants filed their petition for a Writ of Certiorari on July 23, 2007. The Court
granted the writ on October 23, 2007 as to the issue set forth above.
243279v 1 - MJB
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Statement of Facts
The Wendy's Property is located within the Shopping Center owned by Appellants.
[R. at 376.] Both the Wendy's Property and the Shopping Center are included in the property
described in the Declaration, recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office on
September 24, 1982 as entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page 823. [R. at 376.] The
Declaration identifies three distinct parcels of property within the property described therein.
[R. at 376.] The Wendy's Property is located within what the Declaration refers to as "Parcel
Three." [R. at 376.] Plaintiff/Appellant White Investment, Inc. owns parcels one and two,
and American Stores Properties, Inc. ("ASPI") leases Parcel One from White Investment,
Inc. [R. at 30-32.]
The Wendy's property was developed as a Burger King restaurant by The Boyer
Company in or about 1982. [R. at 376.] At that time, a drive-through lane was constructed
on the north side of the Wendy's Property. [R. at 377.] The drive-through lane is bounded
on the north by a narrow, landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, and on the south
by the restaurant (the drive-through lane and related island are referred to herein as the
"Drive-Through Facilities"). [R. at 377.] The Drive-Through Facilities extend from the
northwest corner of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto
what is defined by the Declaration as the "Common Area." [R. at 377.] Exhibit "A" to the
Declaration is a sketch of the Shopping Center labeled "Proposed Site Plan" (the "Plot
Plan"). [R. at 52.] The Plot Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities as two curved lines
running from the northwest corner of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the
243279vl-MJB
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northeast. [R. at 377.] Although the Plot Plan does not purport to be a survey, the physical
relationship between the restaurant building and drive-through lane as shown on the Plot Plan
is generally consistent in scale with the actual location of the restaurant located on the
Wendy's Property and the Drive-Through Facilities. [R. at 120.] From the time they were
constructed in or about 1982 through the present, the Drive-Through Facilities have remained
in continuous use in the same location and configuration. [R. at 378.]
With respect to Parcel Three, the Declaration provides that
No building featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be
located on Parcel Three, except as shown on the Plot Plan, without the prior
written consent of the Owner of Parcel Two and ASPI, including consent to
the location of the drive-in, drive-up or drive-through lanes of such facility.
Such consent will not be unreasonably withheld provided that the location of
such lanes and the use thereof do not impede or inhibit access to and from the
conduct of business from the buildings in the Shopping Center or access to and
from the adjacent streets.
[R. at 38.] With respect to "Common Area," the Declaration provides in relevant part as
follows:
Common Area shall be used only for vehicular access, circulation and parking,
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the Owners (i.e., the
owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains), tenants, customers,
invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners and business
occupants of the buildings constructed in the Shopping Center (i.e., the owners
of the property to which the Declaration pertains), and for the servicing and
supplying of such businesses, except as otherwise provided herein . . . . No
building, barricade or structure may be placed, erected or constructed within
the Common Area on any parcel except loading and delivery docks and
covered areas attached to such docks, trash enclosures, outside storage areas
. . . pylon (to the extent not herein prohibited) and directional signs, bumper
guards or curbs, paving, landscaping and landscape planters, lighting
standards, driveways, sidewalks, walkways, parking stalls, columns or pillars
supporting roof overhangs, and any other improvements as may be required
243279v 1 -MJB
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under applicable laws, rules, ordinances and regulations of any governmental
body having jurisdiction over the Shopping Center . . . . The parking and
vehicular traffic patterns for the areas of the Shopping Center which are
designated "Common Area Only" on the Plot Plan [attached to the Declaration
as Exhibit "A"] shall be designed, installed and maintained as shown on the
Plot Plan.
[R. at 32-33; 377-78.] Relatedly, with respect to passage over the Common Area, the
Declaration states that
Each Owner, as grantor with respect to each parcel owned by such Owner,
hereby grants to each of the other Owners, as grantees, for the benefit of each
of such other Owners and their respective tenants, employees, agents,
customers and invitees of such tenants, and for the benefit of each parcel
owned by such grantee, a non-exclusive easement appurtenant to each parcel
owned by each grantee for ingress and egress by vehicular and pedestrian
traffic and for vehicular parking upon, over and across the Common Area
within each parcel or parcels owned by the grantor.
[R. at 34-35.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellants contend first that the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed
because it conflicts with this Court's decision in Nyman v. Anchor Development, L.L.C.,
2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357. There is no conflict because this case is factually different from
Nyman in two important respects. First, unlike the garage at issue in Nyman, the DriveThrough Facilities are expressly permitted by the Declaration. Wendy's has a contractual
right to maintain the Drive-Through Facilities. Second, while the garage at issue mNyman
permanently occupied the defendant's property and could only be used by the plaintiff, the
Drive-Through Facilities are open to all patrons of the Shopping Center and serve to separate
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travel and parking areas as provided by the Declaration. These facts demonstrate that Nyman
is inapplicable to this case.
Appellants also argue that the trial court could not enjoin their removal of the DriveThrough Facilities without first passing on the merits of Wendy's' claim that the DriveThrough Facilities are expressly authorized by the Declaration. The trial court's injunction
was proper because the Drive-Through Facilities are located in accordance with the
Declaration and Appellants failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact on this point. Further, contrary to Appellants' assertion, the trial court did consider the
merits of Wendy's' claim that the Drive-Through Facilities are expressly authorized by the
Declaration. Finally, all claims asserted in this case were before the trial court on Wendy's'
motion for summary judgment and it made no difference whether the trial court granted
Wendy's' request for an injunction or denied Appellants' request for an injunction. This
Court should, therefore, affirm the Court of Appeals' decision.
ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that Appellants' trespass
and breach of contract claims are time-barred. That ruling is not at issue in this appeal.
Based on its determination that the relevant statutes of limitation had run on Appellants'
claims, the Court of Appeals also correctly held that Appellants' demand for an injunction
requiring the removal of the Drive-Through Facilities was untimely. Only this decision is
before the Court. See Order (granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari), dated October 23,
2007.
243279\ 1 - MJB
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Appellants raise two arguments in support of their contention that the Court of
Appeals improperly affirmed the trial court's issuance of an injunction. First, Appellants
contend that the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed because it conflicts with this
Court's decision in Nyman v. Anchor Development, L.L.C., 2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357.
Second, Appellants argue that the trial court and the Court of Appeals improperly granted
Wendy's' request for injunctive relief before making "any determination on the merits that
would support the injunction." See Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellants, at p. 8. Neither of
Appellants' arguments withstands scrutiny. This Court should, therefore, affirm the Court
of Appeals' decision with respect to the injunctive relief granted by the trial court.
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH
NYMAN

In Nyman v. Anchor Development, L.L.C., this Court held that a prescriptive right to
use real property cannot arise out of the maintenance of permanent improvements on land
owned by another. See id., at Tflf 17-18. Appellants interpret Nyman far too broadly to mean
that a person can never exclusively possess real property they do not own. See Brief of
Plaintiffs/Appellants at pp. 11-12 ("[A]s a result of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
[Appellants] are the owners of property from which they are completely excluded, and
Wendy's is in exclusive possession of property it does not own. This result is in direct
conflict with the decision of this Court in Nyman").

As a result of their over-expansive

interpretation, Appellants contend that the Court of Appeals erred by forbidding them to
remove the Drive-Through Facilities. The facts and legal issues in the instant case, however,
243279v 1 -MJB
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are entirely different from those in Nyman in that Wendy's has an express easement to
maintain the Drive-Through Facilities, and the Drive-Through Facilities do not result in
exclusive possession. Consequently, Nyman is inapposite.
A.

Wendy's Has the Right to Maintain the Drive-Through Facilities
under the Shopping Center Declaration

The most glaring flaw in Appellants' argument is its failure to account for Wendy's'
contractual right and express easement to maintain the Drive-Through Facilities. Those
rights arise out of the Declaration, which contains covenants, conditions and restrictions
binding on all of the owners of the Shopping Center parcels. With respect to drive-through
facilities generally, the Declaration provides in relevant part that "[n]o building featuring
drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be located on Parcel Three, except as shown
on the Plot Plan . . . ." [R. at 38; 377.] Thus, so long as the Plot Plan shows a "building
featuring . . . drive-through traffic" on Parcel Three, the Declaration expressly authorizes
such facilities.

This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Declaration clearly

contemplates and expressly permits improvements such as the Drive-Through Facilities:
No building, barricade or structure may be placed, erected or constructed
within the Common Area on any parcel except. . . directional signs, bumper
guards or curbs, paving, landscaping and landscape planters, lighting
standards, driveways . . . as may be required under applicable laws, rules,
ordinances and regulations of any governmental body having jurisdiction over
the Shopping Center . . . . The parking and vehicular traffic patterns for the
areas of the Shopping Center which are designated "Common Area Only" on
the Plot Plan shall be designed, installed and maintained as shown on the Plot
Plan.
[R. at 33.]

243279v 1 -MJB
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The Plot Plan attached to the Declaration does indeed show a building featuring a
drive-through lane on Parcel Three. [R. at 52.] Parcel Three is located in the lower right area
of the Plot Plan. [R. at 52.] The Wendy's Property appears in the lower left area of Parcel
Three as a rectangle. [R. at 52.] The Plot Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities as two
curved lines running from the northwest corner of the rectangle to the northeast onto the
Common Area of the Shopping Center. [R. at 52.] Not surprisingly, therefore, the trial court
expressly found that "[t]he Drive Through Facilities extend from the northwest corner of the
restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto what is defined by the
Declaration as the 'Common Area' of the Shopping Center,"1 [PL. at 377] and held that the
Declaration expressly permits the Drive-Through Facilities [R. at 380].
The Declaration contains clear and explicit language by which the owners covenant
that permitted Common Area facilities, including "drive-in, drive-up or drive-through lanes,"
[R. at 38], and related features such as "signs, bumper guards or curbs, paving, landscaping
and landscape planters, lighting standards, driveways, sidewalks [and] walkways," [R. at 3233; 377-78], may be located within the Common Area. The Declaration further provides an
express cross-easement for the use of such facilities. [R. at 34-35.]
The existence of these express covenants and easement for the Drive-Through
Facilities renders Nyman completely inapplicable to this case. Unlike the plaintiff in Nyman,
Wendy's need not and does not rely on a prescriptive right to maintain the Drive-Through

'The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court's factual finding on this point.
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Facilities. Rather, much like any tenant who enjoys exclusive possession of land owned by
another pursuant to a lease contract, Wendy's relies on the covenants and easements in the
Declaration as the basis for its right to maintain the Drive-Through Facilities. If the plaintiff
in Nyman had express covenant and easement rights to maintain his garage on the
defendant's property, the plaintiffs resort to the prescriptive easement theory rejected by the
Court would have been wholly unnecessary. Indeed, the case would likely never have arisen.
In any event, Nyman is not implicated by this case, and the holding of Nyman is not
controlling. The Court of Appeals correctly disregarded Appellants' Nyman argument, and
this Court should too.
B.

The Drive-Through Facilities are Unlike the Garage at Issue in
Nyman.

Nyman is also inapposite because the improvements at issue in that case were
significantly different, in both form and function, from the Drive-Through Facilities. Nyman
involved an encroaching garage building that exclusively occupied a portion of the property
and could be used only by the plaintiff. See Nyman, 2003 UT 27, at If 5. By contrast, the
Drive-Through Facilities are open to all of the patrons of the Shopping Center and serve to
separate travel and parking areas as provided by the Declaration. As reflected by the Plot
Plan, photographs, and a survey map of the Shopping Center, the Drive-Through Facilities
occupy "Common Area" within the Shopping Center that is adjacent to an asphalt parking
lot. [R. at 52, 197, 209, and 248.] The Drive-Through Facilities are some distance from
Wendy's' nearest neighbor and are low-lying and unobtrusive. Thus, while the garage at
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issue in Nyman may have had a measurable, negative impact on the defendant's property, to
the extent that the Drive-Through Facilities affect Appellant's property at all, they do so only
in a positive way.
In any event, as noted previously, the Drive-Through Facilities are expressly
authorized and clearly provided for by the Declaration. With respect to the Drive-Through
Facilities, the Declaration provides that:
Common Area shall be used only for vehicular access, circulation and parking,
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the Owners (i.e.. the
owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains), tenants, customers,
invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners and business
occupants of the buildings constructed in the Shopping Center . . . . No
building, barricade or structure may be placed, erected or constructed within
the Common Area on any parcel except loading and delivery docks and
covered areas attached to such docks, trash enclosures, outside storage areas
. . . pylon (to the extent not herein prohibited) and directional signs, bumper
guards or curbs, paving, landscaping and landscape planters, lighting
standards, driveways, sidewalks, walkways, parking stalls, columns or pillars
supporting roof overhangs, and any other improvements as may be required
under applicable laws, rules, ordinances and regulations of any governmental
body having jurisdiction over the Shopping Center . . . . The parking and
vehicular traffic patterns for the areas of the Shopping Center which are
designated "Common Area Only" on the Plot Plan [attached to the Declaration
as Exhibit "A"] shall be designed, installed and maintained as shown on the
Plot Plan.
[R. at 32-33 (emphasis added).] Again, no agreement authorized the garage at issue in
Nyman, much less an agreement as clearly contemplative of the Drive-Through Facilities as
the Declaration. This fact, as well as the fact that the garage at issue in Nyman and the
Drive-Through Facilities at issue here are materially different in form and function,
demonstrate that the Court of Appeals' decision in this case is not in conflict with Nyman.
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As the conflict Appellants perceive simply does not exist, Nyman provides no basis for
reversing the Court of Appeals' decision.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL
COURT'S GRANT OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Appellants argue that the trial court could not enjoin Appellants' removal of the
Drive-Through Facilities without first passing on the merits of Wendy's' claim that the
Drive-Through Facilities are expressly authorized by the Declaration.

See Brief of

Plaintiffs/Appellants at pp. 13-15. Appellants' argument has two prongs, neither of which
has merit.
A.

No Issue of Fact Precluded Summary Judgment.

The first prong of Appellants' argument is that summary judgment was inappropriate
because there is "a genuine dispute of fact as the [sic] whether or not the Drive Through
Facilities of Wendy's are consistent with the Declaration." Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellants at
p. 13. Put another way, Appellants contend that whether the Drive-Through Facilities are
located where the Declaration allows them to be located is disputed. Because there is a
dispute, Appellants claim, it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment and
enjoin the removal of the Drive-Through Facilities. In reality, there is no dispute and
summary judgment was appropriate, as the Court of Appeals recognized.2
2

Summary judgment was appropriate without regard to the existence of a factual dispute
about the location of the Drive-Through Facilities because such a dispute was not material to the
trial court's determination that the statutes of limitation had run on Appellants' breach of contract
and trespass claims. Courts recognize numerous situations in which the passage of time results in
a non-owner's exclusive right to use another party's property. See, e.g., Hirshfield v. Schwartz, 110
Cal. Rptr.2d 861, 871-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming trial court's creation of an equitable right
243279vI-MJB
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While the Court of Appeals declined to address the issue, the trial court correctly
determined that the Drive-Through Facilities are indeed located in accordance with the
Declaration.

The Declaration is a contract like any other.

As such, so long as the

Declaration is unambiguous, the interpretation of the Declaration is a matter of law.

See

Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, ^ 36, 70 P.3d 1. A contract is ambiguous "if
it is 'unclear, it omits terms, or the terms used to express the intentions of the parties may be
understood to have two or more plausible meanings.'" Quaid v. United States Healthcare, Inc.,
2007 UT 27,110, 158 P.3d 525 (quoting Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, f 15, 133 P.3d
428).
The Declaration is unambiguous with respect to the location of the Drive-Through Facilities
because the Plot Plan clearly shows their position. Indeed, Wendy's and Appellants agreed that the
Plot Plan represents the Drive-Through Facilities with two curved lines extending from the
northwest corner of the rectangle representing the Wendy's restaurant. [R. at 120,279.] Inasmuch
as the Plot Plan includes only one pair of curved lines to represent the Drive-Through Facilities, the
Plot Plan is not susceptible to more than one meaning. Further, because the Plot Plan is clearly not
drawn to scale, includes no dimensions, and purports to be nothing more than a sketch of the
Shopping Center, the parties to the Declaration must have intended to permit construction of the
Drive-Through Facilities where they in fact constructed them. Had the parties to the Declaration
wanted to specify the location of the Drive-Through Facilities with greater precision than they chose

to occupy property owned by others); Noronha v. Stewart, 245 Cal. Rptr. 94, 96-97 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (reversing trial court's determination that defendants did not have an irrevocable license to
maintain a wall on plaintiffs' property).
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to, they could have done so. That they did not demonstrates their intent to provide for construction
of the Drive-Through Facilities where the Plot Plan generally shows them to be. Any purported
ambiguity regarding the intended location of the Drive-Through Facilities was completely removed
when the Drive-Through Facilities were constructed in 1982.
Appellants attempted to create a factual dispute with the expert testimony of Mark Babbitt.
Mr. Babbitt purported to approximate a scale for the Plot Plan of one inch being equal to 125 feet.
[R. at 279.] Using his estimate, Mr. Babbitt compared the Plot Plan with a recent, to-scale survey
map of the Shopping Center. Mr. Babbitt contended that his methodology shows that the DriveThrough Facilities are between two and approximately ten feet from the locations specified by the
Plot Plan. [R. at 280-81 ("The North edge of the access for the drive thru window in [the Plot Plan]
angles to the Southwest and is from 2 feet to over 10 feet closer to Wendy's north property line than
the access shown on Wendy's survey.").] A litigant cannot, however, prevent the entry of
summary judgment merely by asserting that an issue of material fact exists. Rather, there
must be a genuine dispute. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this case there was not. Since the
Plot Plan is not a to-scale survey, all Mr. Babbitt demonstrated is that the Drive-Through
Facilities are, where the parties to the Declaration constructed them, as depicted on the Plot
Plan.
The parties to the Declaration obviously eschewed precision when it came to depicting
the location where they constructed the Drive-Through Facilities. The parties were content
to simply sketch two curved lines extending from the rectangle representing the Wendy's
restaurant. In consequence, the trial court correctly determined that there was no genuine
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dispute that the Drive-Through Facilities are located consistent with the Plot Plan. Summary
judgment in Wendy's' favor was thus appropriate and the Court should affirm the Court of
Appeals.
B.

The Court of Appeals Properly Affirmed the Trial Court's Denial
of Appellants' Demand for Injunctive Relief.

Appellants' also assail the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the trial court's issuance
of an injunction by arguing that it was improper to enjoin removal of the Drive-Through
Facilities before "any judgment on the merits of [Wendy's'] breach of contract claim." Brief
of Plaintiffs/Appellants at p. 14. Appellants are mistaken about the nature of the trial court's
disposition of this case in two respects.
Appellants' first mistake is in believing that the trial court failed to pass on the merits
of Wendy's' claims before enjoining interference with the Drive-Through Facilities. Id. In
fact, the trial court fully considered the location of the Drive-Through Facilities and entered
appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial court concluded in relevant
part as follows:
9.
Although the Declaration generally forbids the construction of
improvements on common areas, it expressly authorizes Drive Through
Facilities located on Parcel three as shown on the Plot Plan.
10.
The Drive Through Facilities are consequently excepted from the
Declaration's general prohibition of improvements on the Common Area and
are, in fact, expressly permitted.
11.
Because the Drive Through Facilities are expressly permitted by
the Declaration, Wendy's' is entitled to a declaratory judgment decreeing that
the Drive Through Facilities may remain in use in their present location and
configuration.
243279v 1 -MJB
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[R. at 380.] Clearly, the trial court interpreted the Declaration and, based on the undisputed
fact that the Drive-Through Facilities are located consistent with the Plot Plan, properly
issued an injunction.
Appellants' second mistake is their assertion that "the only injunction at issue before
the trial court or the Court of Appeals was the injunction issued by the trial court on Wendy's
request." BriefofPlaintiffs/Appellantsatp. 14. This was not the case. Wendy's moved for
summary judgment "on all causes of action asserted in [Appellants'] Amended Complaint,
and all causes of action asserted in Wendy's Counterclaim." [R. at 114-15.] While Wendy's
Counterclaim certainly included a request for injunctive relief, Appellants' Amended
Complaint did too. Indeed, the First Cause of Action set forth in Appellants' Amended
Complaint demanded "an order . . . requiring Wendy's to vacate the property and to restore
the property to its condition prior to the construction of the drive-through facilities." [R. at
81.] Thus, Appellants' request for an injunction requiring removal of the Drive-Through
Facilities was squarely before the trial court on Wendy's' motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals did not, as Appellants suggest, improperly allow Wendy's to
use the statutes of limitation applicable to Appellants' breach of contract and trespass claims
as a sword, rather than as a shield. See Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellants at pp. 14-15. Rather,
the trial court and Court of Appeals both correctly ruled that Appellants' contract and
trespass claims are time-barred. In consequence, the Court of Appeals explained, Appellants'
request for injunctive relief is also untimely. See 2007 UT App 211, f^J 27-30 (citing Field-
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Escandon v. DeMann, 251 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) and Troeger v. Fink,
332 P.2d 779, 782-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) for the proposition that requests for injunctive
relief for the removal of permanent trespasses are barred by the statute of limitation
applicable to trespass claims). Significantly, Appellants do not contest the Court of Appeals'
determination that their request for injunctive relief is time-barred.
This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' decision without regard to the precise
basis for the injunctive relief granted below. SeeAfridi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005
UT 53, f 5, 122 P.3d 596 (quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993)
('"We may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the [district] court, even
if it is one not relied on below.'")) This is so because it makes no practical difference whether
the lower courts ruled that Wendy's is entitled to an injunction or that Appellants are not
entitled to an injunction. Wendy' s sought an injunction "restraining [Appellants] from taking
any action to inhibit or preclude Wendy's from using and maintaining [the Drive-Through
Facilities]." [R. at 23.] Appellants demanded an order requiring the elimination of the
Drive-Through Facilities. [R. at 81.] Given that these requests are obviously diametrical
opposites, granting Wendy's' request and denying Appellants' demand produce precisely the
same result: the Drive-Through Facilities remain in their present location. As the Court of
Appeals correctly concluded that Appellants' right to challenge the location of the DriveThrough Facilities expired many years ago, Appellants are altogether without a legal right
to remove the Drive-Through Facilities. The lower courts correctly enjoined them from

243279v 1 -MJB

18

doing so without regard to whose claim for injunctive relief was granted and whose was
denied.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' decision with respect to injunctive
relief for all of the foregoing reasons.
DATED this

/

day of January, 2008.
PARRWADDOUPSBROWN G E E & LOVELESS, P.C.

By:
Ronald G. Fussell
Matthew J. iall
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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